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NOTES
great public interest, their continued service being essential to the health,
safety and general welfare, should have the right to act to prevent public
danger. It is felt that seizure would be the most effective method of en-
abling Ohio to exercise its inherent police powers, while not infringing
upon the federally guaranteed rights of the disputing parties.
It is submitted that an Ohio act, patterned after the national emer-
gency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provided
for seizure after a dearly defined emergency had resulted from a utility
stoppage, would fill Ohio's needs. Seizure is a way of reconciling col-
lective bargaining with the community's interest in maintaimng the pub-
lic health and safety. Seizure should not profit either the employee or
employer. Its sole purpose iS the continued operation of the utility. It
is a crisis measure and would be reserved for critical situations. It would
only apply to public utility stoppages and would be considered only after
a strike had threatened the welfare of the people. It would not mush-
room into private industry, being applicable only to those activities cov-
ered by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.63  It would be predi-
cated upon a steadfast belief in the principles of free collective bargaining.
Before the "hot potato" burns another community, Ohio must take
some action to correct the inherent weaknesses of its present laws.
Whether it be by the enactment of a junior Taft-Hartley emergency bill
or by seizure or a combination thereof, the State has a duty to exert its
police power to protect the people of Ohio.
JAMEs F. O'DAY
Income Tax Consequences of Divorce and
Separation
Divorce has become a commonplace matter. Its frequency draws at-
tention to the fundamental human problems which arise from the sever-
ance of a family relationship, and here the lawyer's primary concern is
with the adjustment of personal conflicts. The general practitioner may
seldom think of the intricacies of taxation as a tool to be used in his
domestic relations work. Yet just as modern business has geared itself
to the powerful consequences of the federal tax laws by employing de-
vices to lessen liability, so individuals have become more conscious of
preserving their earnings through active tax planning. This awareness is
making income tax considerations a highly persuasive factor in the shap-
ing of post-marital plans.
c OHIo REV. CODE § 4905.03.
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Income tax liability on alimony and support payments is defined by
various inter-related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
Although there seems to be no logical approach to a discussion of these
provisions, the Code itself makes a general classification of the control-
ling rules. In order to understand how each statutory rule operates in
conjunction with the others, the primary sections will be sketched in an
outline similar to that employed by the Code. This will be followed by
a more detailed analysis of the workings within this framework.
Taken in light of past experiences which led to their adoption, the
Code provisions have been sufficiently construed to provide a beacon for
the tax planner. The beam becomes dim at tumes, but it is adequate for
day-to-day meetings with the income tax facet of divorce and separation.
It should be borne in mind that actions taken to achieve a given income
tax advantage may often have adverse consequences in the realm of estate
and gift taxation. While thorough analysis of these matters is beyond
the scope of the present comment, brief reference will be made to them
where their existence may be influential.
THE PRIMARY CODE PROVISIONS
Under the 1939 Code, alimony and support arrangements were dealt
with as a personal expense. They were neither included in the wife's
taxable income nor deductible by the payor.2 The Revenue Act of 19423
adopted the more realistic view of taxing payments as income in the
hands of the wife who actually received or was entitled to receive and
use them for her own support.4 Accordingly, the husband could deduct
such payments if the amounts were also includible in his own gross in-
come. Such treatment was not extended to payments for child support
however, since they were only available to the wife for a limited purpose
and did not actually constitute income to her. This view was carried
over into the present Code, along with the substantive changes deemed
necessary in light of the difficulties experienced in the intervening period.
Section 71 sets out the situations in which payments shall be treated
as taxable to the wife and provides certain requisites which must be met
before the amounts paid must be included in her gross income. The
classification made in its subsections is as follows:
'Throughout the text the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 will be cited as the Code, and
the INT. REv. CODE OF 1939 as the 1939 Code. Other statutory authorities will be
fully-cited. The husband will be treated as the payor and the wife as the recipient;
the same rules apply where the situation is reversed, the wife paying and the husband
receiving. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. § 7701 (a) (17).
'Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)
a56 STAT. 816 (1942), 26 U.S.C. § 22 (1952)
'H.R. REP. No. 23333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
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(a) periodic payments received by the wife are taxable to her if
made
(1) incident to a divorce or separation decree,
(2) under a written separation agreement, where there is
separation in fact,5 or
(3) where there is a decree for "her support"' (the last two
provisions are new),
(b) amounts received by the wife which are allocated to the sup-
port of minor children are not includible in the wife's income;
and
(c) to be included in her income, payments must be "periodic"
rather than a fixed sum with installments. Should the husband
make the payments by a transfer of property, they are taxable
to the wife as income if they are "periodic" in nature. This
holds true whether such amounts are paid from income or prin-
cipal, so long as the transfer was made in contemplation of
divorce or separation. However, if the transfer is made with-
out contemplation of divorce or separation, section 682 con-
trols and only payments made out of income from the property
are taxable to the wife as a beneficiary.
Section 215 deals with the consequences to the husband of alimony
and support arrangements. It provides that the obligor spouse may de-
duct the payments made if they are taxable to the wife and also includible
in the husband's gross income.7
A distinction has been made in the Code between direct and indirect
alimony payments. While both types are taxable to the wife if they
qualify as "periodic" only direct payments may be deducted by the hus-
band. If the payments are made indirectly (from sources other than the
husband) as a result of his transfer of some interest in favor of the wife,
the amounts are not includible by him in his own income. Therefore
they cannot be deducted. Instead, sections 71 (d) and 682 come into
play to allow an exclusion. The result reached is the same in either case,
since only the party who actually receives the payments pays the income
tax.
The requirement that payments have the effect of discharging some
legal obligation arising from the marital relationship to be deductible runs
throughout these provisions. The husband's payments must be recogmz-
able as the performance of a duty to continue supporting the wife. Where
'The agreement must have been executed after August 16, 1954, and each spouse
must file a separate return.
'The decree must be dated after March 1, 1954, there must be separation in fact,
and separate returns must be filed.
The husband must itemize and not elect the standard deduction.
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they appear to be made in exchange for the transfer of a property interest
by the wife to the husband, they do not qualify as alimony." However,
if a clause is added to such an arrangement which can somehow be re-
lated to alimony or support, the test may be deemed to be met.' A sim-
lar question is raised when the amount arranged by decree is subsequently
increased. If the legal obligation is said to have been discharged com-
pletely by the original decree, the husband runs the risk of not being
allowed to deduct the increased portion. Framing the decree to allow the
court continuing jurisdiction over alimony and support will probably pre-
vent a discharge of the marital obligation.' °
The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942 did not extend to pay-
ments made under a separation agreement when the agreement was not
part of a final decree. In such cases, if the alimony was to be treated as
taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband, an additional requisite
had to be met. The agreement had to be "incident to" the divorce or
separation. Since the 1954 Code has dispensed with this "incident to"
rule where the arrangement is not part of a decree," the difficulties en-
countered under it are rapidly becoming insignificant. However, because
this theory continues to govern transactions which arose prior to the
present Code, it merits brief mention.
In situations where the parties entered into an agreement before ob-
taining any decree, later waiving alimony in the decree due to the suffi-
ciency of the already existing arrangement, the tax court developed a
"mutual contemplation" test.'2  It was insisted that both parties must have
contemplated divorce or separation at the time the agreement was entered
into if the payments were to be "incident to" such action. The circuit
courts rejected this theory and treated the payments as "incident to" the
decree if divorce or separation was not precluded by the agreement under
8 Frank J. Dubane, 10 T.C. 992 (1948).
'Brown v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (provisions combined
property interest and alimony, the whole being contingent on the husband's in-
come); Luckenbach v. Pedrick, 116 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. N.Y. 1953) (father pay-
ing the sons ex-wife), Marcia Pierson, 21 T.C. 826 (1954) (husband's corpora-
tion paying to divorced spouse); Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1954) (clause added
waiving all claims for alimony); Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951) (payments
to wife s mother "for and in behalf" of the wife)
'o Several courts have, with the aid of different rationales, treated the duty to sup-
port as surviving the divorce decree in order to make subsequent increases includible
in the wife's income. Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357 (2d Cit. 1954); Cox v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d (3d. Cir. 1949), Frederick Douwalter, 9 T.C. 580 (1947).
1INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 5 71 (a) (2). "If a wife is separated from her husband
and there is a written separation agreement executed the wife's gross income
includes periodic payments received after such agreement is executed which are
made under such agreement. " (Emphasis added)
1 George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192 (1948); Robert W Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1948)
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which they were made.13 In situations where alimony was provided for
in the decree, but later modified or a further agreement entered into, the
early view demanded that the change be connected in some manner with
the decree itself.14 Later, the incidence required for the allowance of de-
duction was stretched to run to the divorce status instead,15 the usual re-
sult being taxation of the wife and a deduction for the husband. The
necessity for courts to continue such construction in order to allow de-
ductions in these situations ended when Congress inserted the present
provision regarding a written separation agreement.
CHILD SUPPORT
Since the Code provides that payments from any source are not taxable
to the wife nor deductible by the husband if they are allocated to child
support, only two major issues exist. The first is whether an arrange-
ment is dearly designated to be for child support. If it is, the question
then becomes which party should be entitled to claim the child as a de-
pendent.
Where the entire amount is received without allocation for the com-
bined support of the wife and child, the whole is treated as alimony.' 6
Where it is not dear whether an amount has been designated for child
support by the terms of an agreement or decree, a "severability" test is
used to resolve the issue. Each portion of the instrument will be read
in its relation to the whole. If this approach satisfies the court that some
amount was intended to be for child-support, a division is made where
subtraction will indicate the amount that was intended to be alimony.17
The balance is then removed from the wife's taxable income as child-sup-
port. Where an original decree is amended to provide the missing desig-
nation, the amendment is without retroactive effect.' s It will, however,
"Commissioner v. Miller, 199 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1952); Feinberg v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 260 (3d Cit. 1952); Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cit.
1952). See also Stewart v. Rothensies, 114 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
" Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 P.2d 803 (D.C. Cit. 1950), affirming, 11 T.C. 1093
(1948); Cox v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949), affirmnmg, 10 T.C.
955 (1948).
"DuPont v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 978 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Smith v. Commissioner,
192 F.2d 841 (1st Cit. 1951); Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cit.
1949).
26 It is immaterial that the wife in fact used such amounts for child support. Dora
H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
- Thus apportionment has been found where the terms called for reduction in
monthly payments under the following circumstances: Mandel v. Commissioner,
185 F.2d 50 (7th Cit. 1950) (child dying); Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T.C. 807 (1948)
(wife dying); Robert W Budd, 7 T.C. 413 (1946) (wife re-marrying or child be-
coming self-supporting after attaining majority).
2'Edna M. Gilbertson, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 5 51192.
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be sufficient to remove subsequent payments from the alimony category.
When definite allocation to child support is found, the husband loses
his alimony deduction to the extent of that amount. However, if he sup-
plies over half of the child's support, he is still entitled to the $600 de-
pendency exemption under section 151.19 If he does not have )tustody
of the child, his daim may be subject to a difficult problem of proof.
The wife, undoubtedly, has the details of the total cost of the child's sup-
port and will probably desire this exemption herself. Practically speak-
ing, disputes can be avoided if the parties reach an agreement concerning
dependency. Although not binding on the government, such agreement
eliminates inconsistent positions and thereby reduces the likelihood of a
contest.
PERIODIC VERSUS INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
If a payment is to be treated as alimony taxable to the wife, section
71 (c) requires that it be periodic. A payment is periodic if it is -not an
installment on a principal sum. By negative definition then, periodic
payments are those which are either indefinite in amount, or if definite,
they are indefinite as to their duration. However, if a fixed sum obliga-
tion is to be paid over a period longer than ten years from the date of
the decree or instrument, installments not exceeding ten percent of this
sum are treated as periodic and includible in the wife's income for the
taxable year. The computation of this ten-year-plus period starts when
the husband's obligatzon is said to become binding.20
The periodic test is applied in order to determine whether a particular
arrangement specifies a fixed sum so clearly that the payments made
under it are to be viewed as installments, taxable to the husband. If an
aggregate total to be paid over a period of ten years is determinable by a
mathematical formula, the payments are installments.2 ' Requiring a speci-
fied sum to be multiplied by the number of periods over which it is to
be paid does not differ materially from expressing the total amount. Dif-
ficulty is encountered, however, where the arrangement contains a prin-
cipal sum followed by what would normally be a periodic provision. Does
a contingency render the mathematical calculation sufficiently indefinite
to warrant treating the entire arrangement as periodic? The answer to
"Payments held to be alimony cannot be counted as part of his child support by the
husband, even though both parties originally intended the payments to be such.
Richard P Prickett, 18 T.C. 872 (1952)
" When the agreement was incorporated into the decree, this was held to be the
date of the agreement rather than the date of entering the decree. Commissioner v.
Tillie Blum, 187 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dented, 342 U.S. 819 (1951),
see also Harry Blum v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949)
" Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949); Frank P Orsati Esmnre. 12 T.C. 188 (1949)
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this questuon has followed an uncertain path among the courts, turning
usually upon the type of contingency involved.
The first problem area exists where the sum is certain, but the obliga-
non to pay it may cease on the happening of an expressed contingency
such as the death or re-marriage of the wife. The courts are in conflict.
The tax court has treated such arrangements as non-deductible income to
the husband. A principal sum was said to have been specified "in simple
arithmetic" with complete disregard for the contingencies which might
release the husband before the time had run, unless such events had actual-
ly happened.22 Several circuit courts have opposed this view, treating the
very presence of such contingencies as enough, by itself, to make the ex-
pressed sum uncertain. The leading decision expressing this point of
view is Baker v. Commtssoner,2a where the court reasoned that even
though the death of a wife might be predicted, her re-marriage certainly
could not be.24 The hint that the wife's life span could be computed
actuarially would seem to make her re-marriage the only event capable
of putting such a fixed sum within the periodic category. However, the
death contingency has been held to accomplish this result where the re-
marriage contingency was not included.25 While the tax court has reso-
lutely "stuck to its guis,"26 the proposed regulations have adopted the
rule of the circuit decisions27
The second problem area arises where the arrangement fixes a prin-
cipal sum for a sufficiently indefinite time (or for ten-years-plus) to
make it periodic and provision is further made for the payment of a
larger sum over a period of less than ten years. If the provisions were to
be viewed as a single unit, they could be treated as one series of payments
which is to last indefinitely and is therefore periodic. No decisions are
reported, however, where payments on the larger fixed amount were re-
garded as periodic. Instead, the courts have used a "severability" test by
which they treat only the smaller indefinite sum as periodic and entitled
to deductible alimony treatment.28
21J. B. Steinel, 10 T.C. 409 (1948).
1205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing, 17 T.C. 1610 (1935) See also Smiths
Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cit. 1953).
21Id. at 370. The court said: " a divorced wife's re-marriage - in most in-
stances in this respect unlike her death - depends upon some elements of her
own seemingly unpredictable choosing.
'Myers v. Commissioner, 212 F. 2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954) The Internal Revenue
Service has also apparently adopted this view. U.S. ThE/iS. DEPT., YOUR FEDERAL
INCOME TAX, p. 85 (1956).
, James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. 1081 (1953)
'Proposed Regs., § 1.71-1(d) (3) (i) (a), 21 FED. REG. 2662 (1956).
-If "severable." the larger sums are treated as installments; Edward Bartsch, 18
T.C. 65 (1952), af'd per curtain, 203 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1953); William M.
Haag, 17 T.C. 55 (1951)
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Still another type of contingency may be employed. If the amount
to be paid is expressed as a percentage of the husband's income for a
period of less than ten years, the payments may be treated as periodic.
29
This result is based upon the theory that a fixed sum cannot be calculated
where income is subject to variation, so the amount becomes indefinite.
The final situation to be noted involves arrearages of periodic pay-
ments. If the husband pays the amount of arrearages due in a lump sum,
the payment is periodic and may be deducted by him on his tax return.30
However, if the lump sum is paid under an agreement to settle the ar-
rearage, it will not be treated as deductible.31 The distinction appears to
be proper under the Code view that payments may be periodic even
though made at irregular intervals.
32
The courts tend to view payments as periodic if, in one manner or an-
other, the arrangement makes the payments variable or flexible. When
a situation requires the payment of a given amount for a stated number
of years, treatment provided by the Code can be invoked by making the
payments last ten-years-plus.
THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY
It is not unusual to find a husband transferring property rather than
money to the wife as alimony. If such transfers qualify as periodic pay-
ments, they will be treated as taxable income to her.33 The various tax
consequences of a property transfer have been difficult for the courts to
establish and a great deal of confusion still exists. The two most litigable
problems may be looked upon as two sides of a coin. Does the transfer
itself net the husband a taxable gain or loss? At the same time, how is
the income earned by the property to be taxed?
A sale or exchange upon which a gain or loss may be realized by the
husband is said to occur if the transfer discharges a marital obligation
owed to the wife.34  The measure of the gain or loss between the hus-
band's basis for the property and the value of the released familial dains
is complicated by the fact that these claims are not easily translated into
'John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948); Roland Keith Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948).
'Jane C. Grant, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952), af!'d, 209 F. 2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953), Elsie
B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), affd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951)
'Frank J. Loverin, 10 T.C. 406 (1948)
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 71(a) (1) (2) (3)
-1In relation to the contingency problem discussed in the preceding section, if the
transfer fails to meet the ten-years-plus test it could still qualify as periodic if com-
bined with a cash arrangement and the whole is subject to a condition. The entire
payment could be held indefinite.
11Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v.
Mesta, 123 P.2d 986 (3d Cit. 1941)
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terms of dollars. The fiction is therefore indulged that the parties, deal-
ing at arms-length, make the "value" of these released rights either the
fair market value of the property at the time of transfer or a valuation
assigned in the agreement or decree.35 This then provides the starting
point from which the husband's gain or loss may be computed.
Many problems arise in this area under the estate and gift tax sec-
tions of the Code, and the fact that double taxation may occur is appar-
ently irrelevant.3 6 There seems to be very little relation between these
different taxes, and the factors which determine their application have
little correlation.37
Turning to the other side of the coin, if the transfer is made directly
to the wife, she will be treated as a purchaser for value and taxed accord-
ingly on income from the property.3 8 The difficulty arises under section
215, wich allows the husband to deduct only those amounts which are
also includible in his own income. Where the payments are made out of
income from property which is in the hands of some third person as the
result of an arrangement, the husband is deprived of this deduction. Sec-
tion 682 comes into play where such an arrangement was made before
there was any thought of divorce or separation. Section 71 (d) deals
with transfers to third persons which discharge marital obligations in-
curred in contemplation of a marital rift.3 9 In both situations, the pay-
ments are taxable to the wife and exdudible by the payor. However, the
amount differs, since section 682 allows only payments made from in-
come to be excluded while section 71 (d) allows exclusion of amounts
paid out of both income and principal.
The cases wich call for an application of tis distinction usually arise
where a trust is created or an annuity purchased for the benefit of the
'Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
Although a gratuitous transfer of appreciated property does not subject the trans-
feror to a capital gain under section 1001, it may put him within the estate and gift
taxes of sections 2501, 2512, 2035-38 and 2043. However, the moment adequate
consideration is furnished for the capital asset (i.e., release of the marital support
right), the transfer escapes estate and gift taxability but is subject to a capital gains
tax under sections 1001 and 1221. Also, should one spouse be held to have made a
taxable gift, the married persons provisions become significant. See sections 2513
(gift splitting) and 2523 (marital deduction).
7 In estate and gift tax situations, only the release of support rights constitutes suf-
ficient consideration to escape. Where any other rights such as dower are released
in addition to that of support, an allocation is required by the commissioner. E.T.
19, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166. An escape is allowed without meeting this test if
the transfer is "effected" by court decree; Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106
(1950). As to the gift tax only, an escape is also allowed by section 2516 if the
transfer is by an agreement entered within two 'years prior to divorce.
s Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947)
-"It also covers those not originally made in contemplation of divorce or separation
which are later incorporated expressly to discharge the marital obligation.
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wife. It must be emphasized that while there are a number of advan-
tages available through the use of these devices,40 they are highly limited
by the inherent traps4 into which the unwary planner may stumble. Cau-
tion should be exercised in deciding whether such an arrangement will
merit a sufficiently advantageous treatment to offset the disadvantages
which are likely to result from the circumstances.42  It is interesting to
note that the courts have not been asked to decide whether the husband
realizes a gain or loss upon transfer of property in these situations. This
implies that taxes are not being asserted by the government 43 nor losses
claimed by taxpayers.
When an arrangement is made involving the use of life insurance as
alimony, the treatment given to premiums, proceeds and gains or losses
on transfer by assignment are the crucial issues. The courts demand full
ownership of the policy by the wife. This has become the test for de-
termining whether premiums paid by the husband may be treated as de-
ductible alimony payments under the Code.44 The rule evolved from
cases where the husband was denied a deduction if he also sought the ad-
vantage of regaining the policy should the wife predecease him. Where
the wife was before the court on the question of includibility, a different
test has been used .4  Non-measurability of the wife's economic benefit
was the criterion for treating the payments as not includible in her in-
come. What effect, if any, this will have on the husband's deduction un-
der section 215 remains to be seen.
Where a pre-existing policy is assigned as alimony or support, the
death proceeds are not taxable as -ncome unless the beneficiary is a pur-
"They are normally used where absolute transfer would deprive the husband of an
economic benefit other than income or where the wife desires added security against
modifications. Generally, the husband desires control and recovery at the death of
the wife without being subject to the income tax or to the wife s claims during the
interim. The husband who owns extensive property but has relatively little income
can pick up an exclusion where a deduction would be useless to him. There is also
added security in independent management by a third party.
"The estate and gift taxes apply where they may be least expected. Where minor
children are also supported, a legal obligation is discharged, but a remainder to
such children results in a gift, since there is no obligation for a father to leave an
inheritance. In some jurisdictions, a trust will not be subject to later modification
unless a decree mentions or grants alimony. Likewise, unless adequate legal repre-
sentation for each party is recited, there is the possibility that the relationship may
be treated as confidential, resulting in an extremely close scrutiny of the agreement
by courts.
"For a brief but thorough evaluation of today s alimony trust see 95 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 884 (1956).
"This was the effect in EDNA W GARDNER TRUST, 20 T.C. 885 (1953)
"Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); Raoul Walsh, 21 T.C.
1063 (1954); Anita Quimby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947)
11 Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953)
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chaser for value.46 If the wife released her marital rights in return for
the assignment, she will probably be viewed as having given considera-
tion and therefore be taxed as a purchaser for value on any excess above
her costs. While this application can probably be avoided if the wife
takes out a new policy and the husband pays the prermums, 47 her safest
solution appears to be the omission of insurance from the decree or agree-
ment altogether. The wife may be given additional cash as alimony or
support and pay the premiums herself if she desires this added security.
48
RELATED MATERS
While there are a number of related areas which do not tie in directly
with the Code's classification, only the two most frequently encountered
need be mentioned. These are temporary alimony or support payments
and attorney's fees.
Under the 1939 Code, alimony deductions could not be allowed for
payments made prior to a final decree.49 The present Code contains the
added provision of section 71(a) (3) which includes in the wife's in-
come payments made under a decree for "her support." It seems logical
that alimony petdente lite should fall within this provision, and the pro-
posed regulations agree.5 The only doubt concerning the husband's de-
ductibility was cast by the Senate report, which hinted that the provision
was meant to cover separate maintenance decrees.8 ' The choice of
language used may prove unfortunate where temporary payments are for
the combined support of the wife and minor children without allocation.
If the word "her" is strictly construed, such payments might be treated
as not being within the provision and therefore not taxable to the wife.
The proper result can be reached by according such an arrangement the
same effect it receives under section 71 (b), the whole being treated as
alimony. To accomplish this, it may be said that Congress referred to
support and maintenance with the intention of merely distinguishing
them from the final settlement of marital obligations. Payments under
an interlocutory decree should be subject to the same treatment, without
regard to the decree's effect on the marital bond. Under the 1939 Code,
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 101(a).
,7 However, the Code reference is to a life insurance policy or "any interest therein,"
wich might invoke the rule.
"While there are no adverse tax consequences, neither is there anything to prevent
the wife from spending as she desires.
"Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C. 916 (1951); Joseph A. Fields, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950),
aff'd, 189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951).
nProposed Regs., § 1.71-1(b) (6) example (4), 21 FED. REG. 2661 (1956).
n SENATE REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954).
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the decree had to have the effect of severing the marriage by state law
before payments under it were deductible as alimony.5 2
Legal fees may be deducted by the wife as a non-business expense,
but only to the extent that they are attributable to collecting alimony or
support which is taxable to her.53 The husband, however, can deduct
neither his own expenses of defending nor those which he may pay to the
wife's attorney.54 Although husbands' fees in connection with preserving
income-producing property from wives' daims have come within this
rule of no deduction, inroads are now being made where the circum-
stances are particularly appealing.55
CONCLUSION
Divorce decrees and separation agreements have acquired income tax
consequences which demand caution on the part of the draftsman. Cer-
tainty is required for successful planning, and a simple recital that one of
the parties will bear the tax burden can no longer be relied upon.56 In-
stead, the primary sections of the Code and the decisions construing them
must be carefully applied to each particular problem depending upon
whether taxation to the wife and deductibility to the husband is to be
sought or avoided. With the exception of allocations to child support,
if the arranged payments discharge a marital obligation to the wife and
are made indefinite enough as to amount or duration to qualify as peri-
odic, they are well on their way to being included in the wife's income.
Once this is accomplished, the payor is very likely to be entitled to a de-
duction. At the same time, hidden and often undesired results in other
areas must be investigated. When evaluating the respective merits of one
arrangement over another, the lawyer must be aware of repercussions
which may occur regarding the daiming and proving of child dependency,
gains, losses and income from property transferred directly or in trust,
and estate and gift tax liabilities.
While the general practitioner's concern with these matters has been
relatively recent, he can no longer afford to ignore this opportunity to be
of service. His advice takes on a monetary value which can be readily
I See Commissioner v. Evans, 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1954).
r'Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), af'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951); Barbara
B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949)
'Hunter v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 219 F.2d 69
(2d Cir. 1955), Lindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1952); aff'd, 202 F.2d 28 (9th
Cir. 1953)
'McMurtry v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 114 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Baer v. Commis-
sioner, 196 F.26 646 (8th Cir. 1952)
5 Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
978 (1950)
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